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Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/09 has anew brought the issue of bank risk at the heart of the academic discussion. A review of the literature shows that different proxies that come from balance sheet and profit and loss information of banks are used to measure bank risk. However, there is no consensus which measure fits best to gauge bank risk. This becomes crucial, if the measures capture different aspects of bank risk, which then leads to different interpretations of results conditional on the risk proxy. We aim to provide an overview by comparing the most commonly used measures for bank risk for the population of U.S. commercial banks between 1995 and 2013.
We employ four risk proxies. First, we use the Z-score which indicates banks' distance to default by calculating the difference between banks' profitability and the equity ratio of banks, scaled by the volatility of bank profitability (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Berger et al., 2009; Anginer et al., 2013 Anginer et al., , 2014 Klomp, 2014; Gropp et al., 2014) . Second, non-performing assets which include loans past due 30 or 90 days, nonaccrual loans and other real estate owned indicating bank asset risk are used by, e.g., Barth et al. (2004) , Berger et al. (2009) , Gropp et al. (2010) , Cole and White (2012) or Jiménez et al. (2013) .
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Third, loan loss provisions are an estimate of future losses that reduce the operating income for the current period (Ahmed et al., 1999; Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) . Fourth, loan loss reserves (allowances) are a contra asset that reflect the amount of loan provisions on banks' balance sheets and reduce the book value of loans (Elliott et al., 1991; Hasan and Wall, 2004; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014) .
According to Carbo et al. (2009) who investigate various proxies for bank competition, we do three things in this study. First, we use data for U.S. commercial banks between 1995 and 2013 and calculate four common proxies for bank risk (Section 2). In Section 3, we then analyse correlations and explanatory power between these variables and test whether the measures are useful in predicting bank failures (Cole and White, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Lepetit and Strobel, 2015; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014; Shaffer, 2012a,b; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) . We give a short conclusion in Section 4.
Data
We use balance sheet and profit and loss data for all U.S. commercial banks between q4:1992 and q4:2013 provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We append information on bank failures for the same period from the FDIC Failed Bank List. The FDIC provides quarterly data. We require for the banks to have consecutive quarters only which results in a maximum number of 10,332 banks in 1995 decreasing to 6,055 banks in 2013. We exploit the quarterly observations and calculate a 12-quarter rolling standard deviation (SD(RoA)) of banks' return on assets (RoA) 2 for each bank i which limits the observation period to 1995-2013. We then collapse the data on a bank-year (i,t) level.
We calculate a Z-score for each bank and year with
EQ is the ratio of bank equity over total assets. 3 The Z-score indicates a bank's loss absorbing capacity (Laeven and Levine, 2009 ), i.e., if the Z-score is lower, the bank is less stable. Z-scores are often skewed, therefore it is common to take the natural logarithm (Laeven and Levine, 2009 ) which we also do (hereafter Z-score). Also Lepetit and Strobel (2015) show that the log of the Z-score performs well to capture insolvency risk. We multiply the Z-score by −1 so that more negative values indicate more stable banks.
Next, we calculate the ratio of non-performing assets (NPA) 4 over total assets 5 according to Cole and White (2012) which includes loans past due 30 and 90 days, nonaccrual loans and other real estate owned.
We further calculate banks' loan loss reserves 6 over total assets (LLR) which reflects banks' contra asset items that reduce the loan volume from the balance sheet. The equivalent item from the profit and loss statement is loan loss provisions 7 which should reflect a reasonable estimate of coming losses from loans. We again standardize by total assets (LLP). 3 FDIC item eqv. 4 FDIC items: p3asset, p9asset, naasset and ore. 5 FDIC item asset. 6 Allowances is equivalent. The FDIC item lnatres. 7 FDIC item elnatr. 8 We winsorize one massive outlier value (-12018) to the next value of the distribution. with the remaining j proxies. shows that the variation in LLR and LLP explained by the other risk proxies is sensible to crisis periods.
Results
Comparing the pattern over time for the explained variation in the Z-score and NPA, we find again a higher R-squared for NPA.
The ultimate signal for bank risk is a default of a financial institution. We use a probability model explaining the occurrence of a bank failure (0/1) with the four risk proxies (lagged by one year). The dependent variable equals 1 if a bank failed. We report marginal effects of probit regressions. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
failure probability, respectively. The joint specification in column 5 shows that all four variables explain the variation in bank failures by around 52%. While three variables remain significant, the economic impact is highest for the Z-score and NPA.
Conclusion
We investigate four proxies for bank risk that are frequently used in the literature. Our analysis shows that non-performing assets are a good proxy for bank risk for two reasons. First, non-performing assets nest the alternative proxies as shown by the high share of variation in non-performing assets explained by the Z-score, loan loss reserves and loan loss provisions. Second, non-performing assets are well-suited to explain bank failures one year ahead. The latter point also holds for the Z-score whereby the information content of the Z-score seems to differ from the other variables. We conclude that non-performing assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score, which may come with calculation issues regarding the volatility of profitability, in studies of bank risk.
